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Abstract. The wide range of products and services that are being sourced today has made the
company’s procurement organization an increasingly important function. The complexities of
managing sourcing options is greater than ever making the procurement function critical for
overcoming an increasingly global, complex and uncertain sourcing environment. This paper
discusses an overview of relevant sourcing models and their importance for establishing a
strategic sourcing decision, how buyer-supplier relationships play a key role in the strategic
sourcing decision and key attributes of the various models for strategic sourcing. We illustrate
the diversity of the sourcing choices with four strategic procurement scenarios that motivate the
development of solid strategic sourcing decisions. The material is presented as a teaching
document from a point of view that is integrative of key sourcing paradigms and is written from
a context that is readily understandable.
Keywords: sourcing, procurement, business strategy, supply chain management.
1.   Introduction
The wide range of products and services that are being sourced today has made
the company’s procurement organization an increasingly important function,
and the complexities of managing sourcing greater than ever. The objectives
of minimizing procurement costs associated with the acquisition of products
and services, including transaction costs have received well deserved
treatment in the academic literature. The procurement of external resources is
an important tenet of both the strategic and tactical management of buyer-
supplier relationships for any company.  
The objectives of this paper are three fold. The first is to deliver an
overview of relevant sourcing models and their importance for establishing a
strategic sourcing decision. Secondly, to illustrate how buyer-supplier
relationships play a key role in the strategic sourcing decision. The third
objective is to discuss key attributes of the various models for strategic
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sourcing. Today’s procurement model tends to shift from the traditional “us
versus them” mindset to a more collaborative buyer-supplier relationship.
With this in mind, what are our strategic options when considering the
demand networks of the supply chain and the criteria for selecting the most
appropriate process to ensure we meet our corporate purchasing objectives?
All strategies are premised, either explicitly or implicitly on some theory of
how competition works, e.g., Porter’s Five Forces. Furthermore, few
purchasing decisions are made around a single unambiguous factor. Supply
chain procurement strategies are becoming increasingly global, complex and
vulnerable to many supply chain uncertainties. To illustrate the diversity of our
choices, consider the following four strategic procurement scenarios. 
#1 Trusting a Single Source
In the first quarter of 2001, Chicago-based FMC Corporation procurement
group had an epiphany. Consolidate their buy for industrial metals and put it
up for bid. Over the last seven years, they had been primarily single sourced.
A consortium of ten of their manufacturing and fabrication facilities, who
consumed millions of dollars of industrial metals and materials, put their total
buy for these products up for auction. By means of a reverse electronic auction,
FMC in the matter of about one hour was able to assess how well their current
incumbent had been servicing them based on pricing. The bid package,
supplier qualification and platform bid were all handled by Pittsburgh-based
FreeMarkets (now Ariba). The procurement team was delighted at the final
results. It appeared that the cost saving in newly reduced supplier pricing
would more than offset the switching cost associated with moving from the
current incumbent to the successful on-line bidder. FMC’s procurement team
felt that single sourcing was perfectly acceptable considering the costs of
individual supplier failures. Furthermore, the successful bidder had been
screened during the bid procedure and had met all desired requirements
according to the request for quote set forth by FreeMarkets. Based on all
bidders being presumed to be highly reliable, FMC still felt that single
sourcing was the lowest cost approach under all foreseen conditions (Ruiz-
Torres & Mahmoodi, 2007).
#2 An Apple of an Idea
Upon Steve Job’s return in 1997, Apple began the arduous task of reworking
the procurement of critical goods and services and the manner in which they
used their existing supply chain. With an extended supply chain that reached
around the world, Apple, like others in their industry, transported products by
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sea rather than the more expensive option of air freight. Wanting to ensure that
their products would be readily available for the 1998 Christmas season, Jobs
prepaid $50 million for all available holiday air freight space (Satariano &
Burrows, 2011). This move inhibited rivals that later wanted to book air
freight. This same thinking was used in 2001 for the shipment of the iPod from
Chinese factories to consumers’ doors. This new procurement mentality of
spend exorbitantly on the front-end and reap the benefits from greater volume
on the supply-side is now part of Apple’s supply chain-procurement strategy.
A second component of this same strategy was to be close to suppliers and
manufacturers, working to engineer the industrial process that delivers
prototypes into finished consumer goods. For example, when Apple asks for a
price quote for a specific component, it required a detailed accounting of how
the quote was arrived at, including labor and material costs, as well as,
projected operating profit for that product.  A third component requires their
key suppliers to maintain two weeks of inventory within a mile of the Apple
assembly plants in Asia. Payment terms may extend as long as 90 days after
the inventory goes into production. Apple’s bargaining prowess tends to put
downward pressure on prices, which exemplifies Porter’s “Bargaining Power
of the Buyer”. Bargaining power is relational, situational and potentially
mutual. Not the case with Apple and its suppliers. Apple’s bargaining tactics
lead to lower profits and product margins for their suppliers. Apple’s supply
chain-procurement strategy is built on efficiency and speed to market. 
Not every supplier wants to be a part of Apple’s strategic procurement
team. After months of negotiations and an offer of $1 billion up front from
Apple that required a specific supplier to set aside much of its capacity for the
upcoming product cycle, it declined Apple’s business (Satariano & Burrows,
2011). It has become apparent that Tim Cook, Apple’s  CEO, also believes in
the power of strategic procurement and a well managed global supply chain.
#3 A Calculated Risk
No one actually knew what caused the fire that destroyed the Aisin Seiki
Company’s Factory #1 in February 1997, essentially leveling the huge auto-
parts plant. The fire incinerated the main source of a crucial brake valve that
Toyota Motor Corp. purchased from Aisin and used in 20 auto plants in Japan.
Most of the Toyota plants kept only a four-hour supply of the $5 valve
(Reitman, 1997). It was felt that Toyota could not recover for weeks, possibly
months, and that the Achilles’ heel in Toyota’s lean corporate physique had
been exposed. 
By the following Thursday, 36 suppliers, aided by more than 150 other tier
2 and 3 subcontractors, had pieced together nearly 50 separate lines producing
small batches of the brake value. In one case, a sewing-machine maker that had
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never made car parts refitted a milling machine to make just 40 values a day.
The reasons for this success lay in Toyota’s close-knit supply network of parts
suppliers. “Toyota’s quick recovery is attributable to the power of the group,
which handled it without thinking about money or business contracts.” says
Yoshio Yunokawa, general manager of Toyoda Machine Works Ltd., a
Toyota-group maker of machine tools (Reitman, 1997). This practice is a quite
common arrangement in a Japanese keiretsu (Thorson, 2003). Keiretsu
companies would also supply one another, making the alliances vertically
integrated to some extent. This allowed Aisin to ship parts to Toyota plants
under a just-in-time inventory system. A pure alliance was developed between
the two parties where Toyota held 22.6% of Aisin’s stock (Nakamoto, 1997).
Depending on a single source and holding essentially no inventory was
obviously a calculated risk, but it is also what keeps Toyota’s production
system lean (Reitman, 1997). 
All in all, Toyota lost production time amounting to 72,000 vehicles. The
production was made up quickly with overtime and extra shifts. The fire and
its post mortem left Toyota executives convinced that they have the right
balance of “efficiency and risk”. “Many people say you might need to scatter
production to different suppliers and plants, but you have to think of the costs”
of setting up expensive and redundant equipment at multiple sites, Mr.
Ikebuchi stated. “We re-learned that our system works” (Reitman, 1997). 
#4 Keeping the Complex, Simple!
GCM North American Aerospace fabricates parts for the Boeing commercial
airplanes unit of Boeing Company. To make these parts, GCM needs a lot of
metal: 1.2 million pounds of aluminum and 10 thousand pounds of titanium in
2007 (Silver, 2008). While GCM has long been a major supplier to Boeing, the
purchasing process has not always been smooth. Ten years ago, GCM had to
bid for product from some 20 producers and distributors, with significant price
variation and unpredictable delivery times.  Now, GCM simply places an order
with TMX Aerospace, Chicago-based Boeing’s sole contracted supplier of
aluminum and titanium. GCM doesn’t need to bid on the metals, since Boeing
already owns the metal TMX supplies and the price is set well before GCM
enters an order. This resulted in GCM paying about half the price of what it
costs today on the open market. All suppliers pay the same rate, regardless of
their revenues or the size of their contract with Boeing (Silver, 2008). Prices
are no longer negotiated. A purchase order is placed on TMX in care of Boeing
and TMX locates the desired material and quantity in their system of
warehouses. GCM knows the price and when the metal will arrive. On those
rare occasions when TMX does not have the appropriate material or quantity,
GCM has the liberty to buy on the open market and submits the receipt to
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Boeing, who reimburses the supplier. Boeing has had this arrangement with its
suppliers of aluminum and titanium since 1998, when it teamed with service
center Copper and Brass Sales, a division of ThyssenKrupp Materials NA Inc.
The name was changed to TMX and they took on a new objective. TMX is now
the sole distributor of these materials to Boeing’s global network of more than
500 suppliers. Boeing’s senior procurement manager, Jeff Hanley, points out,
“Aggregating demand with a single distributor has given us visibility for the
first time into how much metal is being purchased to support construction of
our airplanes. That supports not only getting the right amount of metal at the
right time, but our pricing strategy, as well. We place long-term contracts with
mills at a stable price (Silver, 2008).” Boeing has placed 12 full-time
employees at TMX’s four warehouses to support and nurture their
relationships with their seven producing mills. Secondarily, they work with the
mills to develop forecast and track performance. Boeing has elected to go with
a 10-year contract with TMX, valued at an estimated $300 million. TMX is
also responsible for handling aluminum and titanium contracts for Boeing’s
global supplier network, which includes suppliers on every continent.
Boeing’s use of a third party materials supply integrator has allowed them
to improve the efficiency of the materials flow as it comes in from the
contracted mills and out to the fabricator- suppliers. It has also allowed Boeing
to pool the risk of dealing with seven mill producers and 500 downstream
suppliers. The TMX model, built around the concept of vendor-managed
inventory has taken the complex and made it simple.  
2.   A Fool-Proof Strategic Procurement System
So how do we go about ensuring a fool-proof strategic procurement system
between buyer and supplier? Which strategy is uniquely crafted to ensure
smooth, free flow of goods and services over the long term? What are the
determinants for selecting the appropriate procurement program? Mr. Craig
Colyer, Vice President Merchandising for Main Steel, says that the
procurement decision is strategic in nature and must be driven by the
commercial implications or value propositions that are being offered in the
marketplace1. The strategic sourcing decision supports and drives competitive
advantage. A tailored sourcing strategy applies the principle of alignment to
the design of a sourcing strategy that matches the value proposition of the
goods or service offerings. It fits the specific prioritization of quality, speed,
responsiveness, variety, innovation and costs. It goes well beyond the method
many organizations use to approach sourcing strategies. As witnessed in the
Boeing/TMX strategic alliance, tailored sourcing specifies for each item or
1. Author’s interview with Craig Colyer, VP Merchandising, Main Steel, April, 2011.
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service what should be bought, from which supplier, and under what terms.
Tailored sourcing recognizes the long term impact and drives continuous
improvement in the company-specific value proposition (quality, speed,
responsiveness, variety, innovation and costs). This strategy becomes a source
of sustainable competitive advantage.   
There are several options for structuring appropriate supplier
relationships. Given the virtually limitless number of variables at work in the
buyer-supplier relationship, the options will be limited to a manageable scope
and dimension for discussion. We will review the following strategic sourcing
decisions and their buyer-supplier relationship:
1. Vertical Integration
2. Traditional Market-Based Supply
3. Traditional Market-Based Supply: Spot Buying
4. Take-Or-Pay Contracts
5. Reverse Electronic Auction
6. Alliance Partnerships
2.1.  Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration is the extent to which an organization owns or highly
controls the network of which it is a part. Little or nothing is subcontracted to
other players in the supply network. Almost by definition, each part of the
operation will receive supply from another part, or parts, of the same macro
operation. Unless the organization has chosen to perform the same activity in
many different parts of its operations, there will be few (probably one) internal
supplier. This allows the potential for very close relationships. Kaoru
Ishikawa’s concept of the importance of the internal customer becomes a
critical component of building quality products and services in a vertically
integrated organization (Russell & Taylor, 2011). At least there is no
commercial confidentiality barrier to an open and intimate relationship being
developed between internal suppliers and internal customers.
At a strategic level, it involves an organizational assessment of the wisdom
of acquiring and owning up-stream suppliers. At the level of individual
products or services, it means the operation deciding whether to make a
particular component or to perform a particular service itself or buy it from a
supplier. An organization’s vertical integration strategy can be defined in
terms of the following (Hayes & Wheelwright, 1984). 
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• The direction of integration
• The extent of the span of integration
• The balance among the vertically integrated stages
The strategy of expanding on the supply side of the network, also known
as backward or upstream, vertical integration, allows an organization to take
control of its suppliers in order to either gain cost advantages or to prevent
competitors gaining control of important suppliers. This is why backward
vertical integration is sometimes considered a strategically defensive move.
Around the 1950s, vertical integration ceased to be an offensive strategy and
became a defensive strategy ensuring a steady source of supply (Chandler,
1990). This defensive move is a function of the rivalry among existing
competitors and the potential threat of new entrants into the marketplace.
The extent of vertical integration is a significant issue today. Some
organizations deliberately choose not to integrate far, if at all, from their
original part of the network; focus on their core competency and nothing more.
Alternatively, some organizations choose to become very vertically integrated.
Take UPS which owns its fleet of delivery vehicles (93,637), as well as, its
own airplane fleet (268) (www.ups.com).  Currently UPS, through its supply
chain solutions group has found it more appropriate to be a non-vessel
operating common carrier (NVOCC) for moving intermodal containers
between continents, sensing vessel operations is not a core competency. If UPS
decides to offer say, “time-definite” shuttle services (single Asian port to
single North American port) for trans-Pacific container freight, further vertical
integration through ownership or control of the vessel and ancillary services at
the ports may be a viable option. On the other hand, many large international
oil companies, such as Exxon are involved with exploration and extraction, the
refining of the crude oil into gasoline, as well as the distribution and retailing
of gasoline. 
The final vertical integration decision is not strictly about the ownership of
the network; it concerns the capacity and, to some extent, the operating
behavior of each stage in the network that is owned by the organization. The
balance of the part of the network owned by an organization is the amount of
the capacity at each stage in the network that is devoted to supplying the next
stage. Therefore, a totally balanced network relationship is one where one
stage produces only for the next stage in the network, totally satisfying their
need. Less than full balance in the stages allows each stage to sell its output to
other companies or make appropriate buys to cover shortfalls from outside the
organization. 
Vertical integration is easier to justify when the total costs incurred by the
integrated processes are reduced. At times vertical integration has been
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justified by looking at savings in one part of the network only, with the
potential of increasing costs downstream in the network.  Vertical integration
is generally regarded as a high-risk strategy since it means high levels of
investment. In deciding to integrate backward because of apparent short-term
rewards, management often restricts their ability to strike out in innovative
directions in the future. Far more organizations over the past 25 to 40 years
have elected to deintegrate rather than integrate. Globalization with the advent
of instantaneous communications, massive container ships, high-speed
personal computers and the acceptance of outsourcing and contract
manufacturing have hastened the pace of deintegration over this period.
Generally, vertical integration makes it difficult for a company to access the
innovation that becomes available in the supply market. The case for vertical
integration is stronger when innovations are systemic, that is, an innovation in
one part of the network requires innovation in other parts of the network to
exploit its full contribution to competitiveness. 
One of the best known explanations of when vertical integration can be
valuable is when vertical integration reduces the threat of opportunism. Here,
the theories of resource dependence and transaction cost economics are in play,
as opportunism exists when an organization is unfairly exploited in an
exchange. One way to reduce the threat of opportunism is to bring an exchange
within the boundary of the organization, that is, to vertically integrate this
exchange. Research has shown that the threat of opportunism is greater when
a party to an exchange has made transaction-specific investments. This
transaction-specific investment is any investment in an exchange that has
significantly more value in the current exchange than it does in alternative
exchanges. Transaction-specific investments make parties to an exchange
vulnerable to opportunism and vertical integration solves this vulnerability
problem by reducing threats from a firm’s suppliers. Contractual pricing
between the two parties for the length of the contract can minimize the threat
of opportunism greatly.
Many practical studies of the performance of companies with different
degrees of vertical integration come up with one of two findings. Either they
show that profitability declines with increasing vertical integration (a function
of high levels of capital investment, company’s lack of flexibility and lack of
access to innovation that becomes available in the marketplace) or they show
that there is a V-shape relationship where companies with medium levels of
vertical integration perform worse than those with either high or low levels of
vertical integration. This would indicate that a company can do the majority of
the R&D, production and processing, and service component and be relatively
successful. On the other end of the spectrum, a company can be low on the
value added side, essentially an assembler and also be successful. The middle
ground is questionable (Buzzell, 1983). In considering vertical integration,
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investment intensity, alternatives to ownership, and scale requirements (the
capacity of each unit of technology) must be evaluated. 
2.2.   Traditional Market-Based Supply
At the very opposite extreme from vertical integration is the idea that both
customer and supplier relationships are defined by “pure” free-market forces.
In fact, in many ways the justifications for market-based supply relationships
are the mirror image of those used to justify vertical integration, namely:
• Competition between alternative suppliers promotes best value.
• Suppliers gain natural economies of scale.
• Customers can exploit the inherent flexibility of outsourced supply.
• It enables the exploitation of innovations no matter where they
originate.
• It helps businesses to concentrate on their core activities.
It is worth noting that the case in favor of market-based, transactional-
driven supplier relationships is usually made on the first of the above points.
The free-market, with reliable, highly qualified suppliers vying against each
other for a customer’s business, is the best long-term guarantee of low costs as
expressed in commodity-service pricing (Ruiz-Torres & Mahmoodi, 2007).
Certainly, the dynamics of the market relationship can be exploited to keep the
costs of outsourced goods and services at a minimum. Since outsourced goods
and services account for at least 50 percent of most organizations’ total sales,
it is profoundly important (www.about.com, 2006). Relatively small
reductions in the price paid for outsourced goods and services can have a major
effect on profits. 
Consider the following simple example:
                        Total Sales = $10,000,000
         Costs of Goods Sold = $7,000,000 (COGS = 70% of Total Sales)
                       Other Costs = $2,500,000 (Other Costs = 25% of TS)
Resulting operating profit = $500,000 (5% operating margin)
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Profits can be doubled to $1,000,000 by any of the following:
• Increase sales revenue by 100 percent to $20,000,000 
• Decreasing “other costs”, such as salaries/ wages by 20 percent
• Decreasing the costs of purchased goods and services by 7.1 percent
Reducing the cost of purchased goods and services by 7.1 percent,
although a challenging goal, does appear to be the most practical option of the
three. Well managed companies establish strategic initiatives each year based
on cost reductions in their purchased goods and services. The higher the
proportion of total costs devoted to outsourced goods and services, the more
pronounced this effect is.
Although market forces are the most important long-term influence on
most business relationships, there are in practice some considerable problems
in relying exclusively on market mechanisms. These issues can be grouped
into three categories of: coping with buyer-supplier uncertainties, costs of
making purchasing decisions (e.g. transaction cost economics), and strategic
risks of outsourcing. A discussion of these categories follows.
Buyer-supplier uncertainty
Theoretically, if all companies in the marketplace are offering exactly the same
product under exactly the same terms, conditions, performance and quality, the
purchase could be made strictly on price. This is enhanced by reducing
uncertainty through working with internal designers to reduce any ambiguity
around how products and services are specified externally to the potential
supplier. However, there are issues of payment terms, long-term source of
supply, ability to get other goods and services in a one-stop shop transaction,
supplier reputation and financial strength. Single-dimension purchasing
decision making is highly unusual. For the majority of purchasing decisions,
multiple factors will be taken into account, giving consideration to trade-offs
and the need to evaluate its options regarding prospective suppliers. 
This is a dynamic process resulting in market uncertainty caused by a lack
of perfect information. Organizations reduce this uncertainty by using outside
expertise. Consulting firms such as PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP. (pwc.com)
who work on the premise that bottom line results begin with finding the right
goods and services, at the right price, at the right time. Additionally, industry
associations provide data on their members to prospective purchasers of their
services. An example is the Metals Service Center Institute (MSCI)
(www.msci.org). MSCI’s mission is to promote the profitability and well-
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being of the metals industry and its role in the North American manufacturing
value chain. Likewise, transaction uncertainty can be reduced by seeking third
party endorsements from other customers of potential suppliers. 
Costs of Making Purchasing Decisions
Whenever market mechanisms are employed to reduce buyer-supplier
uncertainties, it becomes apparent that considerable effort is involved, making
them expensive to manage. Researching information regarding suppliers
capabilities is quite time consuming, this is a traditional role of the
procurement function and they are routinely faced with the perfect decision
dilemma. That is, when using the traditional market-based supplier relationship
as a sourcing mechanism, you need a very large purchasing resource to make
the best, most efficient decision. In practice, companies will accept something
less than a perfect decision in order to limit the resources needed to make the
choice. Nevertheless, when making the purchasing decision using traditional
market mechanisms, transaction cost economics are an important issue for
companies adopting this procurement strategy.
Strategic Risk of Outsourcing
An additional problem, with an over reliance on market mechanisms, is the
potential strategic risks of outsourcing. If companies choose to outsource some
of their activities to the best suppliers, the market mechanisms that made those
suppliers the best could result in the suppliers becoming more profitable and
more powerful than the purchasing company. A classic component of Michael
E. Porter’s “Five Forces”, the bargaining power of suppliers is at work, leaving
the purchasing company at the mercy of the supplier (bargaining power of the
suppliers is greater than the bargaining power of the buyer). If an operation is
going to outsource some of its activities to the market, it should be very careful
in establishing the appropriate safeguards. 
The decision on whether market mechanisms are appropriate can be
summarized by considering the number of qualified suppliers in the market
and the switching costs to the buyer for changing suppliers. As represented in
Figure 1 (Kapoor & Gupta, 1997). 
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Figure 1: Traditional Market-Based Supply in Buyer-Supplier Relationships
When the switching cost to the buyer of making a change in suppliers is
very high and there are few alternative suppliers, it is unlikely that the buyer
would want to use pure market mechanisms (lower-right). The buyer’s hand is
relatively weak, whereas the supplier has a relatively high, short-term secure
position. Under these conditions, it is likely that some kind of partnership
arrangement may be more appropriate. Conversely, when the buyer has many
alternative suppliers and the costs of switching between suppliers are low, it
could be argued that under these circumstances, leveraging the free market is
the best way for a buyer to keep the performance and efficiency of their
suppliers competitive (upper-left). 
In the other two quadrants of Figure 1, the issues deal with uncertainty in
both market and needs. In the bottom-left quadrant, although there are few
alternative suppliers it is not difficult to negotiate with them over the trade-offs
of the buy arrangement. The suppliers are willing to enter into this type of
negotiation, as they are aware the buyer could switch to an alternative supplier
relatively easily and cost effectively. Both parties realize, though perhaps
unspoken, that the buyer cannot constantly be switching suppliers as the few
remaining suppliers would soon know and you would be branded an
undesirable customer. Under these circumstances needs uncertainty becomes
a key issue for the buyer. From the procurement perspective, a realistic
question would then be: “Based on the fact that you and other alternative
suppliers are quite similar in your offerings, how can your organization
differentiate itself in support of my special procurement needs?” The top-right
quadrant is quite different. Here there are many alternative suppliers. No buyer
can have perfect knowledge of all potential suppliers, resulting in high market
uncertainty. As a result of many options, one would expect a wide range of
alternative deals and supplier performance levels. Although buyers can easily
find an alternative supplier, a switch will only occur when the differential
between the existing suppliers’ performance and the prospective new
suppliers’ performance is sufficiently high enough, in order to recoup the high
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costs of switching. An appropriate buyer’s position would be: “I am aware that
I can find a higher supplier performance level in the market place, but am
willing to work with you, if you can commit to meeting the best performance-
costs level available.” 
2.3.   Traditional Market-Based Supply: Spot Buying
When the nature of the supply relationship is impermanent or we’re dealing
with non-forecasted needs, we may find ourselves involved in spot buys.
Traditionally, a budget is available for purchasing certain items over a finite
time horizon. A portion of this budget is spent on initial procurements (OEM,
MRO, etc.) and then the remainder of the budget is set aside for so called spot
buys. A spot buy occurs whenever the initial procurement for each item is
exhausted and there remains an unmet demand. As spot buy purchases are
usually accompanied by higher unit costs, there is an incentive to minimize
these purchases by having sufficient initial procurements. Beyond the unmet
demand need for the spot buy, historically it has also been used by the
procurement department to take advantage of falling prices in the open market
in order to dollar cost average with existing inventory.
The company must mitigate the potential of non-procurement personnel
getting into the spot buy market and playing havoc with working capital and
inventory carrying cost.  A system that identifies off-contract purchasing
requests quickly and automates the establishment of new contracts for spot
purchases should be created. This reduces the costs and negative purchase-
price variance associated with off-contract spot buys and gives the company
leverage in case of disputes that may arise regarding the price, quality or
material supplied.
2.4.   Take-Or-Pay Contracts 
When we establish a contractual agreement, whereby the buyer is
unconditionally obligated to take any product or service that he is offered (and
pay the corresponding purchase price), or to pay a specified amount if he
refuses to take the product or service, we have what is commonly known as a
take-or-pay contract. These contracts are most often used in the utility industry
to back bonds to finance new power plants. A take-or-pay contract stipulates
that the prospective purchaser of the power will take the power from the bond
issuer or, if construction is not completed, will repay bondholders the amount
of their investment. Take-or-pay contracts are a common way to protect
bondholders. In a precedent-setting case in 1983, however, the Washington
State Supreme Court voided take-or-pay contracts that many utilities had
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signed to support the building of the Washington Public Power Supply System
nuclear plants (Pope, 1990). This action caused Washington Public Power to
default on some of its bonds, putting a cloud over the validity of the take-or-
pay contract. Because of the nature of the take-or-pay obligation in the
contract, the buyer inevitably will seek to contend that it is not able to take
delivery of the product or service due to force majeure and that the minimum
quantity for which the buyer is obliged to take in the period in question
(typically annually) should be reduced. Sellers are highly resistant to the
suggestion of any interruption in income flow and will contend that force
majeure cannot be claimed for a failure or breakdown in plant or facilities
which could have been overcome or avoided by the buyer.
2.5.   Reverse E-Auction
In the 1990s reverse e-auctions were projected to be a widely used
procurement tool. However, not all buyers saw the economic benefits of
reverse e-auctions and the current usage is more limited than earlier expected.
Reverse e-auctions are similar to traditional competitive bidding, but suppliers
compete online, in real-time. The term ‘reverse’ emphasizes that the
competitive bidding between suppliers drives pricing down, rather than
competition among buyers driving prices up as in a forward e-auction, as
witnessed on an eBay auction. To-date, e-auctions use has not reached the
initial optimistic projections made in the late 1990s. Why this shift in thinking?
Some researchers suggest that concerns with ethics and supplier relationships
are barriers to e-auction adoption. Others show that while many procurement
managers are not philosophically opposed to e-auctions, they cannot
economically justify e-auctions costs (Beall, et al., 2003). Evidence in some
cases shows that the price reductions obtained were not sustainable once the
new relationship and day-to-day requirements had been established. When the
incumbent loses the e-auction, the successful bidder must then demonstrate
that they can perform all service functions, as well as, or better than the
incumbent. Cost savings are often overstated because the quoted pricing
cannot be attained or sustained and costs of implementation are not adequately
understood by the successful bidder. As price reduction is the primary benefit
of e-auctions, it is important to measure cost savings empirically in assessing
the profitability of e-auctions. Procurement managers use close-of-auction
(COA) price reductions to monitor e-auction performance. COA price
reduction is defined as the difference between the historical price paid to the
incumbent supplier in prior transactions, and the lowest bid price in a given bid
event. This measurement is often called the identified savings, and is most
frequently reported in trade press and published e-auction research articles
(Hur, et al., 2007). 
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It is important to note that reported cost savings cannot always be attained
(Hur, et al., 2007). Purchase price is just one factor of total acquisition cost
leading COA price reductions to overstate total cost saving accrued from e-
auctions. GE observed on average a 16% COA price reduction, which in reality
resulted in an empirical 8% savings (Hannon, 2001). Eaton Corporation
reported a 20-30% COA price reduction, but realized an implementation
saving of 15-20% (Anonymous, 2003). 
2.6.   Alliance Partnerships
The development of alliance partnerships between customers and suppliers in
supply networks is sometimes viewed as a compromise between vertical
integration and traditional market trading. The alliance attempts to achieve
some of the intimacy and coordination efficiencies of vertical integration,
without the necessity for the customer (buyer) to own the assets. It also
attempts to achieve the robustness of service quality and the incentive for
continuous improvement, which is often seen as the benefit of traditional
market trading without the transactional costs of managing the supply network.
Yet alliances are not just a mixture of vertical integration and traditional
market trading. Alliances are such that the relationship itself and especially the
collaboration, trust and intimacy embedded within it, are effectively
substituted for the ownership of assets. Essentially, alliances between
customer and supplier can be viewed as strategic partnerships. They have been
defined as “relatively enduring interfirm cooperative arrangements, involving
flows and linkages that use resources and/or governance structures from
autonomous organizations, for the joint accomplishment of individual goals
linked to the corporate mission of each sponsoring firm (Parkhe, 1993).”
Partners are expected to cooperate, share knowledge and resources to achieve
joint benefits beyond those that could be achieved by acting alone, resulting in
synergy. Managing alliance relationships involves many factors; most
important of which are collaboration, trust and intimacy. Discussions of these
factors follow.
Collaboration 
Shared success through collaboration means that both partners recognize that
they have more to gain through the success of the other partner than they have
individually or by exploiting the other partner. Companies are actively sharing
knowledge with suppliers. For example, firms such as Bose, Toyota and
Honeywell have adopted particularly close relationships with suppliers, often
involving exchange of key staff (Dixon & Porter, 1994). JIT II (a.k.a., “person-
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in-the-plant”) manufacturing is another way of structuring supplier
relationships with the goal of reducing the lead time from design through
delivery of new products and services to market. In this JIT II system, a
representative from the supplier works full time at the customer’s firm while
being paid by the supplier. The supplier representative works as a member of
the customer’s procurement team, focusing on planning and materials needs,
and is authorized to purchase materials from his own organization and when
necessary, from other suppliers, as well. From the customer’s point of view the
supplier: is always available, develops a deep understanding of the customer’s
needs, and has access to all the information needed to reduce lead times, cut
costs, and improve the procurement process. Suppliers who offer JIT II usually
see an increase in sales to the supported customer. Ryerson, Inc.,
headquartered in Chicago offered a JIT II program to the Tupelo plant of FMC
Corporation, while they were partnered during the late 1990s. This program
was predicated on a predetermined base level of sales volume, profitability,
and days sales outstanding (DSO).
Trust
In the context of alliances, trust means “the willingness of one party to relate
with another in the belief that the other’s actions will be beneficial rather than
detrimental to the first party, even though this cannot be guaranteed (Child &
Faulk, 1998).” Closely aligned with the concept of trust is that of the
willingness to take risks in relationships. The greater the degree of trust, the
greater is the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to the actions of the other.
Although most organizations are aware of varying degrees of trust in their
relationships with their suppliers, they do not always see trust as an issue to be
managed explicitly. There should be a continuous monitoring by the buyer and
seller to assess trust and needs fulfillment. The higher the procedural justice,
the higher the bar will be for both parties to feel treated properly throughout
the process of making decisions that affect both parties, regardless of needs
fulfillment (promised versus delivered). Procedural justice examines the
impact of the process used to make a strategic procurement decision. The
perceived fairness of rules and how decisions are made determines procedural
justice. Procedural justice holds that buyers and sellers are going to be more
motivated to perform at a high level when they perceive as fair the procedural
process used to make decisions regarding the distribution of outcomes. It may
be that managers do not believe that the concept of trust can be analyzed or
indeed managed. Delivery performance can be measured, whereas trust
cannot. Despite the dilemma of measurement, trust is at the heart of any
understanding of alliance partnership relationships.
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It is useful to think of trust in three stages (Lane & Buchmann, 1998). The
most basic level, calculative trust is the trust that arises because one of the
parties calculates that trusting the partner is likely to result in better outcomes
than not trusting them. The business relationship mentioned earlier regarding
FMC and its incumbent supplier, Ryerson was initially built on calculative
trust. Although over time this premise gave way to thinking by FMC that they
could do better, through the process of an electronic reverse auction.
Underlying calculative trust is often the belief that the benefits from
maintaining trust are greater than those from breaking it. Hewlett-Packard,
who has a statistically-based analytical mentality, looks at suppliers from this
calculative perspective and says to its supply base, “You might be capable of
making this product now, but we are thinking two or three products
generations forward and asking ourselves, will you have the capability then,
and do what we want to invest in the relationship for the future (Slack & Lewis,
2008)?”  
Beyond calculative trust is cognitive trust. Cognitive trust is trust based on
a sharing of each partner’s understanding of aspects concerned with the
relationship. These aspects include joint success, learning and problem
solving, along with information transparency, and possibly, dedicated assets,
e.g., consigned inventory or transaction-specific investments. By knowing and
understanding how each other see the world, each partner is able to predict how
the other will react. Cooperative norms are developed when a relationship is
forming, providing guidelines and standards of conduct and allowing trade
partners to set ground rules for future exchanges. Norms are the expectations
about behaviors that are at a minimum are partially shared by the decision
makers on each side of the exchange. 
Even deeper is the concept of bonding trust. This is based on partners
holding common values, moral codes and a true sense of what obligations are
due the partnership. The partners identify with each other at an emotional level
beyond the mere formalities of the partnership. Trust is both cognitive and
emotional based. Progression through these states of trust is often associated
with time and the accumulation of positive, relationship-building experiences.
E-Z-Go, Augusta, Georgia, a Textron Company, has over a period of 40+
years, developed a bonding relationship with Ryerson Inc., its industrial
materials supplier of choice. According to Jerald A. Smith, Director Corporate
Quality, in 2004, E-Z-Go implemented a lean manufacturing, steel integration
program to consolidate all of its metal fabricators throughout its vast global
supply chain and set forth initiatives establishing one set of universal quality
standards.2 E-Z-Go turned to Ryerson and asked them to develop the quality
criteria and approval process. This meant that suppliers in the U.S., as well as,
2. Author’s interview with Jerry A. Smith, Director Corporate Quality, Ryerson Inc., June,
2008.
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China had to meet one stringent quality standard and be certified by one
common supplier standard. This sense of what obligations are due the
partnership went well beyond the conventional buyer-supplier relationship,
into perhaps the next generation of global supply chain management. Bonding
trust has been the key to this growing relationship.
Intimacy
The third dimension of managing alliance relationships involves intimacy.
Intimacy refers to the degree of closeness, understanding and mutual support
that exist between partners in a supply network. It also reflects the degree of
interdependence and transparency of the partnership alliance. Intimacy relies
on each partner’s belief in the other’s attitude and motivation in maintaining
the relationship. In this way, intimacy can be seen as both the objective of, and
the result of, the interaction between attitudes toward the alliance partnership. 
Collaboration, trust and intimacy, coupled with procedural justice and
cooperative norms are the successful manifestations of a well structured and
interactive alliance relationship as seen in Figure 2. A balance of collaboration,
trust, and intimacy within the supply chain offsets uncertainty and risks
associated with the behaviors underlying cultural competitiveness.
Figure 2: Building the Buyer-Supplier Relationship for Sustainable Competitive Advantage
Toyota and its partnership with its parts manufacturer, Aisin Seiki
illustrates this point. Toyota’s quick recovery after the devastating fire in Aisin
Factory No.1 required just such a relationship for its survival. This is common
in Japan’s keiretsu, where they form horizontally-integrated alliances across
many industries (Thorson, 2003). The typical Japanese production network
features assembly and component production plants with low levels of vertical
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integration and a multi-tiered supplier network in which the first tier comprises
a small number of large suppliers, most of which have engineering capability.
Second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers support the first tier in a very
hierarchical system. The first-tier suppliers are called upon to provide
relatively large subassemblies. They are provided with long-term guarantees
but required to take significant responsibility in return. On the one hand, they
would be compensated for underutilized equipment costs in the face of lower
than expected demand. On the other hand, they are expected to meet strict and
ever more stringent cost and quality targets. These types of alliance
relationships between manufacturers and first-tier suppliers in Japan fostered
close communications and coordination and often involved sharing personnel
and transparency of detailed information on costs and production processes. 
3.   Managing the Strategic Sourcing Decision: Buyer-Supplier
Relationships     
Procurement organizations must become more strategic over time. The buy-
side strategy brings significant opportunities to keep their businesses favorably
positioned in today’s intensely competitive global marketplace. The winning
procurement organization will transform buyers into business partners,
integrate suppliers deeper inside their operations, exploit low-cost sourcing
options regardless of where they are found, win the ongoing struggle for talent,
and continually focus on value, solutions and outcomes rather than price,
products, and inputs.  
Managing suppliers in today’s highly networked environment is a greater
challenge than it has been in the past. The trend is for companies to outsource
more of their work, making them more reliant on their suppliers, while creating
more difficult integration problems. The role of the procurement function in
most companies has evolved significantly and as a result, requires far more
senior management participation. Leadership at the executive level is critical
to managing buyer-supplier relationships. Executive leadership must signal the
importance of the procurement function to the organization. They must act as
advocates for the function, be involved in establishing the appropriate buyer-
supplier structure and proactively participate in the design of the supplier
management process to ensure stability, quality and effectiveness for the
whole organization’s benefit. 
Furthermore, supplier management also requires management control in
the form of a strong procurement team, information technology support and
performance measurement. As companies have reduced the number of
suppliers, they have placed greater responsibility on the remaining suppliers.
Procurement organizations must be able to think strategically in the
assessment of suppliers, develop strong supplier relationships, negotiate
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contracts and incentive plans and integrate the supplier base deeper into the
company. The active management of the procurement organization, along with
the strategic procurement model that best fits the strategy for the chosen
market position, will go a long way in developing an understanding of the
buyer-supplier relationship.
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